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Abstract 
 
There has been an ongoing debate over women’s impact on corporations, specifically in top 
executive roles. This study looks at the stock price reaction to the appointment of the first female 
to the board of directors of Fortune 250 companies. Using the Fama-French three factor model 
we observed the abnormal stock price reaction that occurred when a company announced the 
first woman being appointed. Analysis revealed that although the initial stock price reaction was 
zero, the post-five year returns were statistically significantly positive. This is the first study to 
show that having a woman on a firm’s board of directors increases firm performance and adds 
value, suggesting that women should indeed have a place in top management in the business 
world.  
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1. Introduction 
 For most of the era of big businesses, men have been in control of the companies and the 
board rooms. However, there has recently been a shift in society’s opinions, creating pressure for 
companies to have a woman on their board of directors. Recent studies have looked into whether 
or not having a woman on the board of directors is beneficial to a firm; results have been 
inconclusive, with some studies showing women are beneficial, but other analysis shows a 
woman’s effect can be neutral or slightly negative. In this study, we are looking at how the 
appointment of the first woman to a board of directors affects the appointing company’s stock 
performance, both before, on, and after the date of announcement. Previous studies have focused 
on a company’s Return on Equity (ROE) and Total Return to Shareholders (TRS) once a female 
is a part of top management (Catalyst, 2004) while others have found that women can make a 
difference in financial reporting decisions (Francis, Hasan, Park, Wu, 2014) once there are 
enough strong, independent directors on the board of the company (Fogel, Ma, Morck, 2014). 
Different from these studies, our study focuses on the stock price reactions relevant to the exact 
date of announcement of the first female appointed to the board of directors for Fortune 250 
companies. Most studies focus on what happens when there are multiple females in top positions, 
but this study focuses solely on the first female appointed, setting it apart in its significance.  
 In analyzing the stock performance of companies who have announced the appointment 
of the first female to their board of directors, we have focused on the stock prices from three 
years before the date of announcement, to five years after. We have also focused the analysis to 
the date of announcement and analyzed stock performance from ten, five, three, and one day 
before and after the date of announcement, as well as the actual date of announcement. It has yet 
to be fully proven whether markets are efficient or inefficient, with differing schools of financial 
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beliefs having proof of both options. As a result, our findings can be interpreted in light of an 
inefficient market and in light of an efficient market. In an inefficient market, newly released 
information is not reflected in the stock price of a company at a rapid pace. As a result, the 
market’s reaction to the announcement of a female appointment to the board of directors may not 
be correct at the time of announcement, causing the market to adjust with time. In an efficient 
market, all information and new announcements are assumed to already be reflected in the price 
of a company’s stock. Depending on how the market views the announcement and the changes 
taking place, in an efficient market, the stock price reaction to the appointment announcement 
can be positive, negative, or neutral.  
 In the following section we introduce a review of current literature pertaining to the 
presence of females on a company’s board of directors and the effect the presence of these 
females has on the company’s performance.  In section 3, our hypothesis is detailed. In section 4, 
an analysis of the data and methodologies used to conduct this study are presented. In section 5 
we discuss the findings of the study as well as the impact these findings have on the performance 
of a company. How this information should be used in the future when companies are appointing 
new members to the board of directors is also discussed. Section 6 concludes. A table of the 
appointment dates of the first woman to the board of directors for all of the companies analyzed 
can be found in the appendix.  
 
2. Survey of the Literature & Hypothesis 
 The current literature on the effects of females in the corporate boardroom is not all 
encompassing, but does provide a good overview of the different decision-making qualities and 
other aspects that females bring to a company. As society becomes more aware and involved 
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with the issue of few women being at the top of corporations, articles on the subject can be found 
in places beyond academic journals. For example, in the CNN article “What Changes With 
Women in the Boardroom?” the firm The Garden City Group is highlighted, due to 8 of their 15 
board members being women. This firm has performed very well financially, in part due to the 
way women consider decisions differently than their male counterparts (Wallace, 2013). Women 
look at risk differently than men do, and overall tend to take fewer risks. During the most recent 
economic downturn, all funds incurred an average loss of 19%, but the funds run by women 
incurred an average loss of only 10% (Wallace, 2009). Having women in the boardroom clearly 
has an effect on the company’s performance, but current literature argues that the gender of 
board members is not the sole factor behind these firm valuation changes.  
 There is conflicting evidence as to whether the impact of having a woman on the board of 
directors or as CEO has a positive or a negative impact on firms. There is no arguing though that 
having a woman in top management does have an impact on the company’s performance. 
Thomas Schmid and Daniel Urban (2013) postulate that having women on the board of directors 
does lead to a higher firm valuation, but that higher valuation is strongly dependent on the level 
of development in the country where the firm is located. In their paper “Does It Matter Where 
You Work? International Evidence on Female Board Representation,” Schmid and Urban state 
that it is a country’s culture that affects the number of women on a board of directors, and the 
culture, the main determinant for female board representation, in fact has no impact on the firm’s 
valuation.  
 Almost all of the current literatures on females in the boardroom mention the differences 
between males and females, with regard to risk, in some capacity. Many simply mention that 
females are more risk averse, and take into consideration more factors when deciding which 
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projects and risks the firm should undertake. Nadia Loukil and Ouidad Yousfi believe that “In 
the presence of women on the board, firms rely more on internal funds to finance investments 
than debt.” Women tend to be less competitive and “overconfident” than their male counterparts 
(Loukil & Yousfi). This results in the least risky source of financing being used first and the 
most risky source, issuing new equity, being used as a last resort; this is a direct example of the 
Pecking Order Theory that is commonly discussed in the financial world.  However in certain 
firms, particularly banking firms, women have a much different level of risk-aversion than 
women who do not enter the finance industry (Sapienza, Zingales, & Maestripieri, 2009). This 
may be due in part to the qualities a woman has that propel her towards a career in finance. In 
their article, Loukil and Yousfi also find that having women in a boardroom helps to lower the 
absences of male board members; this can result in better decisions being made for the firm by 
the board of directors as a whole (Loukil & Yousfi). Sila, Gonzalez, & Hagendorff found that 
“the degree of risk aversion in women may vanish when they have broken through the glass 
ceiling in order to adapt themselves to a male-dominated culture…they find that female directors 
are more risk loving than their male counterparts” (2014). Perhaps a portion of the effect that 
female board members have on firm valuation is in part due to the females trying to prove their 
value and worth to their male contemporaries. With so many companies trying to bridge the 
gender gap, current literature has not yet revealed what exactly causes the change to firm 
valuation that women cause.  
 Males and females in top management take different approaches with regard to corporate 
financial reporting and accounting decisions. Statistically speaking, when the gender of a firm’s 
CFO changes from male to female, there is a significant increase in the level of accounting 
conservatism, and a significant decrease when the change is from female to male. The decisions 
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a corporation announces reflect the personal risk preferences and decisions of top management. 
Hence, the changes seen with a female in charge reflect the more conservative and risk adverse 
nature women at the top tend to have. Firms that are controlled by females grow more slowly and 
make fewer acquisitions, but the acquisitions that are made provide much higher announcement 
returns (Francis, Hasan, Park, & Wu, 2014). Having board members that favor differing levels of 
risk is important, since it is these “independent” directors that will challenge wayward CEOs. 
Powerful independent directors are able to raise shareholder valuations by “preventing value-
destroying decisions, by meaningfully linking CEO pay to firm performance, and by forcing out 
underperforming CEOs” (Fogel, Ma, & Morck, 2014). The differences in levels of conservatism 
and in financial reporting are linked to the personal preferences of top management. It is in the 
best interest of a company that top management be composed of some independent directors, 
including females, as these individuals are able to raise shareholder valuations and make 
acquisitions that provide higher returns.  
 The current literature on gender diversity in the boardroom focuses on a variety of 
aspects, resulting in inconclusive results when taken together. The analysis appears to be 
conflicting, agreeing only in the fact that women on the board of directors do have an impact. 
What exactly is that impact still remains to be seen; however, it is clear that women approach 
risk and decision-making in a different way than men do. Having a variety of opinions in a 
boardroom can only improve the quality of the decisions being made. It is the purpose of this 
study to attempt to fill in some of the gaps in current literature; we plan to do this by determining 
whether the presence of a woman in the boardroom does in fact impact the value of a firm’s 
stock.  
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3. Hypothesis 
 Factoring in all of our research and our knowledge of financial markets, our hypothesis 
for this study is as follows, with an explanation following: We hypothesize that the 
announcement of the first woman to a company’s board of directors may result in a positive, 
negative, or neutral market response, depending on an efficient or inefficient market state. 
3.1 Inefficient Markets 
 When markets are inefficient, the prices of common stocks and other similar securities 
are not always accurately priced. This implies that market forces are able to drive asset prices 
above or below their true, actual price in an inefficient market. When a female is appointed to the 
board of directors in such a market, the market reaction may be to over – or under – estimate the 
value of having a female director. Assuming that the market does not have prior experience with 
this type of announcement, as is the case when the female is the first appointed for that selected 
company, the market will very easily underreact or overreact initially. The initial under reaction 
implies that investors do not perceive the value a female adds to a board of directors. When the 
initial investor reaction is that the announcement adds more value to the company than it actually 
does, an overreaction occurs. Over time, the inefficient market adjusts to the true value added by 
adding a female to the board of directors. If the initial response was an overreaction, the stock 
prices will fall; if the initial response was an under reaction, the stock prices will rise. There are 
times when an announcement is muted in an inefficient market. This causes the reaction to spill 
over into subsequent years, and the post-announcement market price adjustment to occur over a 
longer period of time. It is very difficult to ascertain the true value of a stock or the true investor 
reaction to a company’s announcement in an inefficient market, but over time the market will 
adjust back to the true values.  
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3.2 Efficient Markets 
 According to the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), in an efficient market it is 
impossible to “beat the market” because stock market efficiency causes existing share prices to 
always incorporate and reflect all relevant information (Investopedia, 2014). “In an efficient 
market, the expected part of the earnings increase should already be reflected in the price” (Ball, 
1994). In efficient markets, the investors’ response to the announcement of the first female 
elected to a board of directors will immediately be reflected in the share price of the company’s 
stock. When female representation is perceived to be a good thing, the market will reflect a 
positive reaction through an increase in the price of the stock. When the majority of the users of 
a product or service are female, women’s voices on a board will add benefit, with the gender 
diversity helping to increase profit margins (VanderMey, 2013). This positive reaction may 
occur if the company and its investors value diversity of opinion. Having a diverse group of 
opinions provides more diverse angles for evaluating problems and decisions, resulting in a 
decrease in likely herd behavior. A diverse group of opinions in the boardroom can also be 
valuable in crisis situations, where corporate performance may depend on the different 
viewpoints directors of different backgrounds have (Adams & Ragunathan, 2013). When a 
woman is selected to become the first female on a company’s board of directors, she is very 
likely to be of an exceptional quality and have outstanding capabilities. A company should only 
select directors that will provide the most benefit to the firm, so each director selected will have 
very high qualifications, whether male or a female. The exceptional qualities that the selected 
female provides to the board will increase the insights and level of oversight provided by the 
board. She is also very likely to be a strong independent thinker, helping her to reach this 
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position. Firms with powerful independent boards have economically and statistically higher 
firm valuations (Fogel, Ma, & Morck, 2014).  
 When comparing males and females, women tend to be the more nurturing of the two, 
and female directors bring this trait with them to every board of directors on which they hold a 
position. When given an increase in resources, females spend more money on children (Doepke 
& Tertilt, 2014). Carried over to a board of directors, one can assume that when females have 
more control over the financial resources of a company, they will be more inclined to share the 
wealth with their investors; this is something that encourages a positive response in investors and 
helps to cause a positive stock price reaction to the announcement of a female being appointed to 
a company’s board of directors. The increased expenditure of women on children, relative to 
spending on pleasure, also relates to the fact that females tend to have more of a long-term 
perspective than males. The ability to plan for the long-term and maintain a long-term 
perspective, whilst still focusing on the short-term, is very important for any company. By 
adding a female to the board of directors in possession of this ability, investors are encouraged 
about the health of the company, causing the stock price to increase. Finally, electing the first 
female to the board of directors sends a signal to the rest of the market that this company is path-
breaking and making changes to improve company performance. Anytime a company is making 
changes to improve, this is seen in a positive light by investors, and the positive attention 
translates to an increase in company stock price, a better top line and bottom line for the 
company, and improved costs of capital for the firm. Investors who realize the value the first 
female elected to a board of directors brings to that company reflect their approval via the 
positive reaction seen in the market value of the company.  
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 When an announcement is made by a company that the financial markets view as being 
neither positive nor negative, the stock price reaction is neutral. A neutral market reaction to the 
announcement of the first female elected to the board of directors occurs when that female is 
perceived to be a “trophy director,” so to speak. The first female elected to a board is always at a 
disadvantage, as she is trying to navigate her way in the director’s world of men. Women in this 
position may not be comfortable standing out, at least initially, and may not want to rock the 
boat, causing their talent to stay hidden and muted. When this is the case, the female director’s 
talent does not translate into any differences for the company; it is essentially the same as before 
the appointment, except that the gender diversity box has been checked. If investors perceive this 
to be the case, they will not have much of a reaction to the female being elected, causing the 
market valuation of the company to essentially stay the same. In some cases a company may be 
known for selecting the best available talent when voting for the new member of their board of 
directors. If this is the case, investors will be aware of this fact and the election of the first 
woman will have no impact, since she is the best talent available; there is nothing extra brought 
to the table just because she is female. Investors would solidify this reasoning if their reaction to 
the announcement of the first female director of a company was relatively neutral, or close to 
zero, and not significant.  
 There are certain instances that have led us to believe that the announcement of the first 
female elected to a company’s board of directors may cause a negative market reaction. It is well 
documented in finance research that women are more risk-averse than men. This may be 
beneficial during an economic downturn, helping to limit losses during these times. But, given 
that recessions are short-lived relative to expansions, the overall effect of women being risk-
averse would be negative. Female’s risk-aversion may prevent them from fully maximizing the 
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benefits presented by an economic upswing. Men are more likely to use additional funds for 
investments, and this is the action that companies should be taking during a bull market (Doepke 
& Tertilt, 2014). Equity can be thought of as a Call option on the value of the assets of a 
company and hence, a risk-averse investment stance will reduce the value of the option (i.e. the 
equity of the firm). This will be reflected as a negative market reaction to the announcement of 
the female being elected.  
 There are instances where the first female elected to a company’s board of directors were 
not elected because of the skills and talent she would bring to the company, but rather so that the 
company could place a checkmark in their diversity box. When this is the case, the female 
appointment does not serve any real purpose or add any value to the company. Given no priors 
since it is the first female elected, this appointment may be an adjustment for both the men on the 
board and the new female director; a dysfunctional board may be the result. When a board is 
dysfunctional, it will not be able to lead the company in the best possible direction, which 
investors will understand and reflect in a negative stock price valuation. The first female 
directors had no female role models, so they may not want to come across as strong and may not 
be clear about their role on the board. Board members must be aware of their specific role as a 
director, and how they are expected to help improve company performance, in order for the 
company to actually improve. It is very rare that a company will improve when director roles are 
not understood, which will be reflected in the market’s valuation of the company. If investors 
believe any of these things about the company or the female selected when the announcement is 
made that a female is the newest board member, we will see a negative price reaction very soon, 
if not immediately after, the announcement and the information is released to the public.  
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 Whether the market is efficient or inefficient plays a role in how we predict investors to 
react to the announcement of the first female appointment to the board of directors. The value the 
market places on a female being elected will help prove whether it truly is beneficial for a 
company to have at least one woman serving on its board of directors.  
 
4. Data and Methodology  
4.1 Data 
 Larcker and Tayan (2013) surveyed the 2012 Fortune 250 companies for 
information on the first women appointed to their board of directors. These are large publicly 
traded US companies. We could identify the exact date (month, day and year) of the appointment 
of the first woman to the board of directors in 16 cases and for another 18 companies we could 
find the month and year of the first women director appointment (in such cases we decided to 
take the middle of the month as the date of appointment). This gave us a sample of 34 companies 
(out of the Fortune 250 companies for the year 2012). We ended up dropping 5 companies from 
the sample because either the company became public after the date of appointment or stock 
price information ended prior to the date of appointment. Our final sample size therefore turns 
out to be 28 (see Table 1). 
4.2 Methodology 
We use the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model augmented with the momentum 
factor as in Carhart (1994) for assessing abnormal stock price reaction when a company 
announces that it is appointing a woman for the first time to its board of directors. The date of 
announcement is taken as day zero in our analysis. The four-factor model is based on the notion 
that expected returns are generated based on the following equation, 
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Rjt = αj + βmj(Rmt) + βsj(SMBt) + βvj(HMLt) + βuj(UMDt) + εjt  
Where Rjt, and Rmt are the daily return on stock J and the market portfolio respectively.  SMBt is 
the difference between the daily return on a portfolio of small stocks and big stocks (small minus 
big). HMLt is the difference between the daily return on a portfolio of high book-to-market 
equity ratio stocks and a portfolio of low book-to-market equity ratio (high minus low; this 
roughly corresponds to the difference between value and growth stocks). UMDt is the difference 
between the daily return on short-term winner stocks and loser stocks (up minus down). The last 
term in the equation (εjt) represents random error. The slope coefficients in the above equation 
(market beta, size beta, value beta, and momentum beta: βmj, βsj, βvj, βuj) represent the sensitivity 
of stock J to common and hence non-diversifiable factors in stock returns. 
 The period [day -279, day -30] relative to day zero is used as the estimation period for 
computing abnormal returns around the date of announcement (days -10 through day +10). In 
other words, parameters of the above model are computed via running a regression of the return 
on the stock Rjt against Rmt, SMBt, HMLt and UMDt based on the 250 days between [day -279, 
day-30] for each stock in our sample. These estimated parameters are used for forecasting returns 
during the announcement period [day -10, day+10] for each stock in the sample. The actual 
return minus the forecasted return is taken as the abnormal return for that day for a given stock. 
The abnormal returns are averaged across all the stocks for assessing the average abnormal 
return for a given day (reported in the tables). This provides an assessment of the market reaction 
specific to the event of a company appointing for the first time, a women to its board of directors. 
 We also examine long-term abnormal returns before and after the date of announcement 
(year -3 through year +5) (See Tables 3 & 4). Our thinking is that the first female directors may 
take time to have a meaningful impact on their companies and/or the equity market may take 
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longer to fully understand and incorporate the impact of female directors on the prospects of the 
companies in share prices. In this long-term analysis, we use monthly returns rather than daily 
returns. We use 36 monthly observations spanning the period (month -35, month-2) for 
estimating parameters in assessing the cumulative abnormal returns over the five years after the 
appointment to the board of directors. For assessing the cumulative abnormal returns during the 
three years prior to the appointment of the first woman to the board of directors, we use 36 
monthly observations spanning the period (month -71, month -38) as the parameter estimation 
period.   
 
5. Findings & Analysis  
 Upon completion of running our tests, interesting results were found. Using the Fama-
French-Momentum Time-Series Model, Value Weighted Index, we found that in the five days 
prior to the announcement of the new director, there was a positive stock price reaction. This 
implies that investors were optimistic about the talent a new director would bring to the 
company, and felt that whoever the new director was, he or she would be the best talent available 
and have a positive impact on the company. However, in the five days after the announcement of 
a female being appointed as the new director, there was a statistically significant negative 
reaction. In an efficient market, there could be a variety of reasons for this reaction, including the 
belief that females are more risk-averse and that the female may only be a “trophy director;” 
there solely to check off the company’s diversity box. When analyzing the results from the 
perspective of an inefficient market, the negative reaction seen may be an under reaction and 
time is needed for the market to correct itself.  
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 When the analysis was extended to cover a longer period of time, post-announcement, we 
found that there was a positive reaction. Both one year and five years after the announcement of 
the first woman being elected to a company’s board of directors, there was a statistically 
significant positive reaction in the market. In an inefficient market, this positive reaction is the 
market correcting itself, over time, from the initial under reaction that occurred in the days 
following the announcement. In an efficient market, the positive reaction implies that investors 
see the value and talent a woman brings to a board of directors. With a significant positive 
reaction so long after the announcement, one can assume that the female director did in fact have 
an impact on the company and helped to increase the company’s value. One reason for this may 
be the long-term perspective a woman brings, or the different way of viewing risk. If the woman 
had not had an impact on the company, we would have seen a neutral response over time. A 
negative reaction would have been found had the woman impacted the company in a negative 
way and lowered the company’s value over time. The positive reaction found implies that having 
women on a company’s board of directors does, in fact, increase the value of a firm, and 
improves the company overall.   
 We also ran cross-sectional regressions comparing abnormal returns from different time 
periods related to the announcement of female appointment to the board of directors, as seen in 
Table 5. In comparing the cumulative abnormal returns from five days to one day prior (-5, -1) to 
the date of announcement with the cumulative abnormal return from one day to five days after 
(1, 5) the date of announcement, we found a statistically significant positive relationship. In 
comparing the long-term cumulative abnormal returns to announcement period returns (day -5, 
day -15), the relationship found was not statistically significant, meaning that the long-term 
returns are not related to announcement period returns. This holds true after it is revealed that the 
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newly elected director is female, as shown through the regression between (month 1, month 60) 
and (day +1, day +5) having no statistical significance. These results show that neither is the 
market inefficient nor is the announcement period reaction suggesting a negative reaction to 
female appointment. Further research may reveal the reasons for these regression results. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 Within in the past few decades, American society has rallied for women’s rights, and 
fought for women to be thought of, and compensated, equally to men. Over time, more Fortune 
500 companies have appointed at least one female to their board of directors. When the first 
female is appointed to a company’s board of directors, the media displays this as a positive 
action, one that benefits women everywhere. However, no study had ever been completed to see 
if the first woman appointed truly had an impact on the company and increase firm performance 
and value, as seen through the market’s reaction and company share prices. The goal of this 
study was to accomplish that goal and determine if having females on boards of directors does, 
in fact, have a positive impact on the company.  
 Through research and thorough data testing and analysis, it was found that initially the 
market reaction to the appointment of the first female to a board of directors is significantly 
negative. However, over time, specifically one and five years after the announcement, the market 
reaction and company share price are significantly positive. For instance, five years after the 
announcement, the mean cumulative abnormal return was 33.09%, meaning that the company’s 
value increased by 33% in the five years after a female joined the board of directors. This implies 
that having at least one female on a board of directors does greatly benefit a company, as seen 
through the performance of the companies in our sample.  
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 Females offer different skills and talents than males. Females tend to have a more long-
term perspective, whereas males focus more on the short-term and increasing profits now. 
Women are also more likely to make decisions that return profits to investors, via dividends, 
increasing positive investor responses. The differences in the ways males and females view risk 
helps the board of directors to make more thorough decisions, through examining more aspects 
of a problem or decision than they normally would have. Having diversity on a board of directors 
most times increases a company’s performance. Since the ultimate goal of every business is to 
make money, firms need to have the best directors possible, who will make the right decisions 
for the company. Having the best group of directors possible should include women.  
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Table 1 
 
Company Director Appointment Date 
Amazon Patricia Stonesifer February 15, 1997 
Aon Joan Manley May 15, 1984 
AT&T Catherine Cleary April 15, 1972 
Baxter Mary Johnston Evans May 15, 1986 
Capital One Financial Ann Fritz Hackett October 28, 2004 
Cardinal Health Regina Herzlinger August 15, 1995 
Conagra Louise Kinney Platt January 15, 1973 
Costco Wholesale Jill Ruckelshaus February 15, 1996 
CVS Patricia Carry Stewart November 15, 1996 
Dominion Resources Mary Fray December 17, 1971 
Edison International Carla Anderson Hills February 15, 1977 
Entergy Lucie Fjeldstad February 2, 1992 
FedEx Judith Estrin March 15, 1989 
Ford Motor Company Marian Heiskell March 11, 1976 
General Dynamics Mary Barra March 15, 2011 
HealthNet Gale Fitzgerald March 15, 2001 
Humana W. Ann Reynolds January 15, 1991 
Huntsman Marsha Evans August 15, 2005 
Illinois Tool Works Susan Crown May 6, 1994 
International Paper Jane Pfeiffer June 14, 1977 
Johnson & Johnson Joan Cooney April 11, 1978 
Johnson Controls Martha Seger May 31, 1984 
Land O’Lakes Connie Cihak February 15, 1994 
Marathon Petroleum Donna James June 30, 2011 
McDonald’s Terry Savage December 15, 1990 
Pacific Gas & Electric Doris Leonard September 26, 1973 
Parker Hannifin Debra Starnes July 21, 1997 
Penske Kimberley McWaters December 15, 2004 
PepsiCo Joan Crawford Steele April 15, 1959 
Starbucks Barbara Bass January 1, 1996 
Tech Data Kathleen Misunas April 5, 2000 
Travelers Jewel Plummer Cobb September 6, 1974 
Waste Management Pastora San Juan Cafferty July 15, 1998 
WellPoint Financial Susan Bayh July 17, 2001 
WellPoint Financial  Bessie LaRae Orullian July 17, 2001 
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Table 2: Short-Term Returns 
       
Days 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Median 
Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 
Positive: 
Negative 
CSectErr 
t 
Rank 
Test Z 
CsectErr t-
stat 
Bootstrap+ 
       (-5 , +5) 0.27% 0.51% 14:14 0.224 -0.146 0.224 
(-3 , +3) 0.32% 0.41% 16:12 0.325 -0.485 0.325 
(-1 , +1) -0.85% -0.55% 12:16 -1.161 -1.155 -1.161 
(0 , 0) -0.45% -0.16% 9:19( -1.284 -1.26 -1.284 
(-5 , -1) 2.02% 1.69% 20:8> 2.986** 2.330* 2.986** 
(+1 , +5) -1.31% -0.88% 10:18 -2.374* -2.384* -2.374* 
       The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, 
respectively, using a two-tail test. The symbols (,< or ),> etc. correspond to $,* and show the direction 
and generic one-tail significance of the generalized sign test.  
      
 +   The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
levels, respectively using a two-tail nonparametric bootstrap of the indicated test. 
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Table 3: Returns after the Appointment Announcement 
       
Years 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Median 
Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 
Positive: 
Negative 
CSectErr 
t 
Rank 
Test Z 
CSectErr t-
stat 
Bootstrap+ 
       1 10.17% 10.95% 17:10 1.817$ 1.399 1.817$ 
2 4.05% 4.86% 17:9) 0.708 0.208 0.708 
3 -0.15% 2.81% 14:11 -0.023 -0.634 -0.023 
4 6.93% 4.60% 13:12 0.930 0.533 0.93 
5 14.07% 12.04% 14:09 1.879$ 2.243* 1.879* 
Cumulative (1 , 3) 13.93% 27.81% 18:9) 1.211 0.562 1.211 
Cumulative (1, 5) 34.20% 39.91% 20:7>> 2.089* 1.827$ 2.089* 
       The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, 
respectively, using a two-tail test. The symbols (,< or ),> etc. correspond to $,* and show the direction and 
generic one-tail significance of the generalized sign test.  
      
 +   The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respectively using a two-tail nonparametric bootstrap of the indicated test. 
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Table 4: Returns Prior to the Appointment Announcement 
       
Years 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Median 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive: 
Negative 
CSectErr 
t 
Rank 
Test Z 
CSectErr t-stat 
Bootstrap+ 
       -5 -11.61% -8.26% 9:14 -1.703$ -1.119 -1.703$ 
-4 -1.16% 4.93% 12:11 -0.150 0.023 -0.150 
-3 -9.52% -15.17% 8:15 -1.338 -0.554 -1.338 
-2 -9.45% -11.05% 8:15 -1.625 -0.581 -1.625 
-1 -11.16% -9.13% 8:15 -1.406 -1.245 -1.406 
Cumulative (-3 ,-1) -30.13% -16.53% 6:17< -1.751$ -1.374 -1.751 
Cumulative (-5 , -1) -42.90% -29.75% 8:15 -1.972* -1.554 -1.972* 
       The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, 
respectively, using a two-tail test. The symbols (,< or ),> etc. correspond to $,* and show the direction and 
generic one-tail significance of the generalized sign test.  
      
 +   The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respectively using a two-tail nonparametric bootstrap of the indicated test. 
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     Table 5: Cross-Sectional Regressions 
     Dependent 
Variable 
CAR (day 1, day 
5) 
CAR (month 1, month 
60) 
CAR (month 1, month 
60) 
CAR (month 1, month 
60) 
Intercept 
-0.020                                
(-3.96)*** 
0.279                                    
(1.89)* 
0.368                                   
(2.04)** 
0.347                                    
(2.18)** 
CAR (day -5, day -1) 
0.346                    
(3.23)***   
-1.323                                          
(-0.23)   
CAR (day 1, day 5)   
-4.558                                            
(-0.75)     
CAR (day -5, day 5)       
-1.559                                           
(-0.55) 
Adj. R
2
 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sample size 28 27 27 27 
     The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a 
two-tail test. The symbols (,< or ),> etc. correspond to $,* and show the direction and generic one-tail significance of the 
generalized sign test.  
     The numbers in parenthesis indicate t-statistics.  
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